The Horse Is Inside Europe

1 · The impulse and my mistake

On 17 October 2026 I saw the first pictures from France. Smoke over the streets, burning cars, tear gas, smashed shop windows. And with them the number that immediately popped up in the feed: hundreds of thousands on the streets, in almost ninety cities. My first thought came fast. It was clear. And it was wrong. My second thought was worse, and I'll come back to it.

I thought: Palestine. Gaza. The war that has been poisoning Europe's debates for three years. I thought of slogans, of flags, of the usual images. In my head the post was already finished: Europe is burning because the Middle East conflict is now on our streets too.

Then I checked.

The French interior ministry counted around 550,000 people, about 110,000 of them in Paris ^[1]. Gaza wasn't the reason. It was about schools, about the teacher shortage, about prices, about austerity. About people who feel their own country slipping out from under their feet.

I was wrong.

But my mistake didn't come out of nowhere. It came from a feed that delivers anger faster than context. And that is exactly where the real story begins. It was about schools. In the end, a town hall burned.

2 · What happened – and how a protest gets hijacked

Let me get this out of the way first: yes, France has a protest culture. The Yellow Vests, pension reform, the banlieues in 2005 and 2023 – we've seen a fair bit there. And today, too, many French people will blame the state rather than those who were on the streets. That's my impression; there are no polls after 17 October yet.

But this has a new dimension. And I think it's tipping. The dynamic is changing, and not only in France. Look at Germany: the AfD at 43.8% in Saxony-Anhalt ^[13]. Look at Italy: Giorgia Meloni has been governing since 2022. And look at France itself: since the appeal ruling of July 2026, Marine Le Pen is eligible to stand again, and the presidential election is in April and May 2027 ^[54]. A year ago, polls already had her crown prince Jordan Bardella ahead in every run-off match-up tested, with 53 to 74% ^[55]. If I had to make a prediction today, just to throw it out there: Le Pen at the 60% mark. That's not a number from a poll. That's my gut feeling after this weekend.

What came next had nothing to do with schools any more. By 19 October around 2,400 people had been arrested and almost 1,000 members of the security forces injured ^[1]. In Limoges the town hall burned out. One person died. President Macron spoke of rioters who wanted to "overthrow the Republic". Prime Minister Lecornu and his government blamed the ultra-left and criminals ^[1]. LFI founder Jean-Luc Mélenchon turned it around: the government alone was to blame ^[1].

To be fair, this belongs here too: shortly before, Interior Minister Nuñez had admitted to the Senate that there were 36 investigations into alleged police violence at school pupils' protests ^[2]. The vast majority on the streets were peaceful. They wanted better schools and an affordable life, nothing else.

And yet a protest doesn't automatically belong to those who carry it.

The mechanism goes like this: a genuine cause brings people onto the streets. The crowd brings attention. The attention builds a stage. And onto that stage climbs a small, well-prepared minority that couldn't care less about schools and prices. It wants confrontation. It doesn't need a cause of its own for that. It simply takes one.

And this minority is no accident. My opinion: what we are seeing here is an unholy alliance. On one side the violent far left, which sees the state as the enemy. On the other side Islamists, who bring a large dose of hatred of Jews with them and contempt for everything that doesn't match their values. And, as the crowning touch: a disrespect for the police, for neighbours and for the community that no longer knows any limits. Next to them stand those who look away and still call the whole thing "protest". How this alliance works, I'll show further down.

And who are the "criminals" the government talks about? Hardly anyone says it out loud. I looked it up. In the 2023 riots almost four out of five of those convicted were French, three quarters born in France, most of them young men under 25 from the suburbs. Fewer than 8% gave the death of Nahel as their reason. Most joined in because they could – out of opportunity, peer pressure, adrenaline ^[19]. For October 2026 the police describe the same picture: young men from deprived neighbourhoods using the situation to loot, alongside the ultra-left and the Black Bloc ^[20].

And then there's a third passenger in the horse. One who needs neither politics nor religion. He just wants to grab things. On 17 October and the night after, the Céline boutique on Paris's Avenue Montaigne was completely trashed, Louis Vuitton's windows were smashed, and Dior, Burberry and Kenzo were attacked too. In Bordeaux Louis Vuitton was looted, in Lyon Hugo Boss burned. AFP reporters saw groups of masked youths with bags full of luxury goods. According to the government, around 3,000 shops in total were damaged or looted; retailers speak of several hundred million euros in damage ^[47]. A police union official called them "opportunistic looters" ^[20].

Nobody smashes the window at Louis Vuitton for better schools. Here a protest is being hijacked for personal gain. And now I'll say how I see it. These weren't random looters. They're organised and just waiting for an opportunity. They come fast, take what's expensive and disappear back into the suburbs. And afterwards they proudly show off their loot on social media. That's not just my impression: participants filmed themselves looting, and the videos racked up millions of views. People used the location features of Snapchat and Instagram to find their way, and private messengers to report where the police were. A French senator summed up the logic: "If you don't film yourself, it's not worth it" ^[56]. Some of the loot then turned up for sale on Vinted and Leboncoin ^[57].

What stands out, and unfortunately this has to be said too: they are mostly teenagers and young adults with a migrant background. I see that in the videos, it fits what the police say about young men from deprived neighbourhoods, and it fits the 2023 figures ^[19][20]. There is no official figure for this, and in France there won't be one either – I explained that above. That's why it's here as what it is: my observation.

These aren't guests. They are often the children and grandchildren of people who came decades ago. Born in Europe, never arrived. That's not a border problem. That's a failure of integration, over generations.

And now my assumption, explicitly as an assumption: I assume that a lot is getting mixed together here, and that a large share of those who hijack, loot and destroy have a migrant background. I can't prove it. And I don't believe anyone ever will. France on principle does not collect statistics by ethnic origin. At most, detours are allowed, such as asking where someone's parents were born – and nobody publishes that kind of information for arrests ^[21]. Someone with a French passport in the third generation doesn't show up as a migrant in any figure. That is exactly the uncomfortable truth: the images exist, in Paris, in Brussels, in Berlin, in many of Europe's big cities. But nobody counts, nobody shows it, and hardly anyone says it out loud. And what isn't counted is easy to stay silent about. I'd like to be wrong. Then let them put the numbers on the table.

In the morning the country remembers pupils, families, trade unionists. In the evening only Molotov cocktails and masked figures. The next day nobody knows the demands of the majority any more – only the violence of the minority.

Those who hijack don't have to win. It's enough if nobody can tell the difference between a cause and an attack any more.

The Greeks didn't come over the wall. They had themselves carried in, hidden in a gift. That's how hijacking works: you arrive in the belly of someone else's cause. The Trojan horse here is not the person protesting, nor the person who comes to Europe. It's the ideology hiding inside – and the extremists who carry it in.

And this is a European picture. On the same weekend thousands also took to the streets in Milan and other cities in northern Italy, against wars and the rising cost of living ^[3]. Different countries, similar anger. And if you look closely, you can see the pattern here in Germany too.

3 · The unholy alliance

At the same demonstrations, in the same channels, with the same enemy images, groups meet that would otherwise have nothing to say to each other.

The 2025 report of Germany's domestic intelligence service (Verfassungsschutz) describes Islamists and left-wing extremists appearing at the same pro-Palestinian demonstrations. Secular pro-Palestinian extremists act as a "hinge" between the two camps ^[4]. The Berlin Senate calls it "strategic convergence without ideological fusion": no shared worldview, but a shared enemy – the police and the state ^[5].

Europol goes one step further: antisemitism is the connecting narrative ^[6].

That doesn't mean everyone who criticises the Israeli government. That would be cheap. It means the point at which Israel is no longer a state but a scapegoat. Where Jews in Berlin or Paris are supposed to answer for the policies made in Jerusalem. Where violence against Jews is suddenly called "resistance". That's where protest ends. That's where hatred begins.

And here comes my second thought from 17 October. I'll say it honestly, even though it hurts: when I see that synagogues in Europe have to be guarded by the police, that Jewish life takes place behind crowd barriers, I think of 9 November 1938. Of Kristallnacht. And I'm afraid of the answer if I asked one of the last living Holocaust survivors whether this is how it started back then.

I know how heavy this comparison is. That's why I want to make it carefully. In 1938 the state stood on the side of the perpetrators. The SA and the Hitler Youth destroyed 1,406 synagogues and prayer rooms, 191 of which went up in flames. Around 30,000 Jewish men were deported to concentration camps, and more than 1,500 people died as a result ^[45]. Today the state protects Jewish life, and that is the decisive difference. But in 2025 the research and information centre RIAS counted 8,725 antisemitic incidents in Germany, almost 24 a day, including 178 assaults ^[46]. That is not normal.

And who does this hatred come from today? For more than half of the incidents, nobody knows. Of the remaining roughly 3,700 that RIAS could attribute, in 2025 almost 2,000 came from anti-Israel activism, around 500 from the left-wing anti-imperialist spectrum and around 170 from the Islamist one. Around 800 came from the far-right spectrum ^[46]. Among criminal offences, the police now count almost every second antisemitic offence as Israel-related ^[32]. In other words: hatred of Jews from the right hasn't disappeared, it has even increased. But it's no longer the largest. The largest today comes from anti-Israel activism and its allies – from the corner that considers itself the morally clean one.

Don't equate. But don't look away. The question isn't whether it's already 1938. The question is who stands by the Jews today. And who stays silent.

My opinion: this alliance lives on resentment, not conviction. One side brings the hatred, deeply rooted, as a narrative it wants to push through. The other side provides the stage and the outrage. And in the end both march under the same banner: against "the system".

And now a bit of sarcasm, because otherwise you'd despair. Let's imagine the alliance books a group trip. At the front the antifa bloc with red flags, behind them "Queers for Palestine" with rainbows and glitter. All together on a solidarity visit to those whose slogans they chant so bravely in Berlin. First stop Gaza: sex between men is a criminal offence there, punishable by up to ten years in prison ^[22]. On to Tehran: there it carries the death penalty, and it is carried out ^[23]. And the communist part of the tour group should read up beforehand on what the Islamic Republic did to its left-wing prisoners in 1988, once it no longer needed them ^[24]. It would be a circus like no other. Only nobody in this circus would be laughing. The most valuable item in the luggage would be the return ticket.

Seriously: that is exactly what makes this alliance so grotesque. One side marches for the very people who would persecute them first. A freedom you only have here in Europe is not defended by applauding its enemies.

And Die Linke, the Left Party? It failed to draw a clear line. How deep the rift goes became clear in October 2024: Klaus Lederer, Elke Breitenbach, Carsten Schatz, Sebastian Schlüsselburg and Sebastian Scheel left the Berlin Left Party – in a dispute over how the party deals with antisemitism ^[7]. These weren't backbenchers. They were former Berlin senators and the long-standing head of the parliamentary group. When your own people leave because the party can't find a clear line, that's not an accident. That's a failure.

And that this isn't an old story was shown on the evening of the Berlin election on 20 September 2026. At the Left Party's election party in Neukölln stood Issa Remmo, a well-known leading member of one of Berlin's big clans. The party says he wasn't invited, the party was public, and there are "neither political nor personal relations" ^[48]. Fine. But he wasn't the only one. According to the Tagesspiegel, two men from another clan were also there, interviewing candidates. An activist who appears for the PFLP – listed in the EU as a terrorist organisation – posed with the Left Party member of the Bundestag Ferat Koçak. The newly elected Neukölln district councillor Basem Said had shared a call for an "election intifada" on election day. And Koçak now has to answer questions from his parliamentary group about his contacts with the Remmo clan ^[49].

A clan boss at a public party is not yet an alliance. But when, on a single evening, clan members, a PFLP activist and a call for "intifada" come together and the party explains afterwards that it knew nothing, then that is exactly the failure I'm talking about. And then a firewall (Brandmauer) to the left is needed, and not just on paper.

To be fair: this belongs to the Left Party too. That precisely these people stood up.

Whoever brings the hatred has a name. We must be allowed to say it without implicating millions of others.

4 · Islamism is not Islam – but it is real

First the most important thing: Islam is not Islamism. The vast majority of Muslims in Europe live peacefully. They work, raise children, pray, celebrate, argue, love – and want what we all want: safety, respect, a future.

But Islamism exists. And it is not an invention of right-wing scaremongering.

The Verfassungsschutz estimates the Islamist potential in Germany for 2025 at 28,645 people. 9,110 of them are considered violence-oriented. The largest current is Salafism, with 11,200 people ^[8]. In Berlin the scene grew to 2,590, mainly due to Salafists ^[9].

These are not 28,000 terrorists and not convicted criminals. They are people whom the Verfassungsschutz assigns to extremist activities. But behind the number stands an ideology that rejects democracy, equal rights, religious freedom and Israel's right to exist.

How deadly this ideology is becomes clear over the long view. Europol has been counting terrorist attacks in the EU since 2006. From 2006 to 2025, 218 of them were jihadist. They killed at least 414 people – almost nine out of ten of all terrorism deaths in the EU in those twenty years. For comparison: in the same period left-wing extremists and anarchists carried out 499 attacks, with ten deaths. Right-wing extremists 50, with twelve deaths ^[50]. Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin. The list of cities is a map of Europe.

And the Berlin Verfassungsschutz says something many don't want to hear: online propaganda has become the "central driver of radicalisation", especially among young people ^[9]. The preachers no longer sit only in the back courtyard. They sit in the feed. With short videos, with outrage, with simple answers to difficult questions.

My opinion: it comes in waves. First the many who arrive, integrate, free themselves. Then the hatred grows, quietly – online, in the schoolyard, in closed groups. Not in everyone. Not even in most. But in enough to call it by its name.

That's why: zero tolerance for the ideology. And this isn't only about Jews. It's about Christians – think of the priest Jacques Hamel, who was murdered at the altar in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in 2016, or of the three people who died in the Notre-Dame Basilica in Nice in 2020 ^[58]. It's about women who want to decide for themselves how they live. About homosexuals. About apostates. About everyone who doesn't believe what the Islamists believe. It's about what we call Western values: freedom, equal rights, the right to be different.

And it's about something else that is rarely said. About the misguided. About the young ones who were caught and poisoned. Many of them can't read Arabic, have never read the Quran themselves and depend on someone explaining to them what it says. And that's exactly where the hate preachers stand ready, supposedly guiding them with the words of Allah. Pardon me: misleading them. When thousands of "Islamic State" registration forms became public in 2016, around 70% of the foreign recruits in them were recorded as having only "basic knowledge" of Islamic law. Five per cent were considered advanced ^[59]. So most of them knew hardly anything about the religion they supposedly wanted to fight for.

I'm prepared to call them victims too. Misguided sheep. That doesn't excuse a single act. Whoever strikes, whoever murders, bears the responsibility, entirely alone. But whoever only fights the perpetrators and leaves the shepherds in peace will get new flocks every year.

So: zero tolerance for the ideology and its preachers. Not for the people who believe.

Our values include Israel's right to exist and the peaceful coexistence of all religions in one place. Whoever fights that has nothing to gain here.

What follows from this? For me, a very simple principle.

5 · The guest principle – and the honest number

Whoever comes to Europe, whether as a refugee, a skilled worker or a student, should be welcome. But welcome doesn't mean without rules. Whoever lives in a country that protects them, gives them education, medicine, security and freedom, carries responsibility.

My principle: whoever is a guest behaves. Whoever brings violence forfeits their right to stay. No more, no less.

At the same time you have to stay honest, in both directions. The 2025 police crime statistics (PKS) show: violent crime has fallen, by 2.3% in cases and 2.6% in suspects. Among immigrants even by 7.2% ^[10]. At the same time, 42.9% of suspects in violent offences were not German ^[10] – with a population share of around 14 million foreign nationals among a good 83 million inhabitants, so roughly one in six ^[11].

That is a clear over-representation. And talking it away helps nobody.

I wanted to know how this number breaks down, and I didn't even have to do the maths. The federal government itself published it in response to a parliamentary question, as a rate: suspects of violent crime per 100,000 residents of the same nationality, 2025 ^[60]:

So Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans are around ten times as high as Germans. These are predominantly Muslim countries of origin, and many came as refugees in the last ten years. One has to be allowed to say that.

But the same table also shows: Bulgarians, Serbs and Romanians, from predominantly Christian countries, are three to five times as high as Germans. And Turks, from a predominantly Muslim country but often in Germany for generations, are lower than Bulgarians. So religion alone doesn't explain it. What the top group has in common is something else: a great many young men, war and flight in their baggage, no secure status, little work, communal shelters. I suspect that religion and ideology add to this for some of them. I can't prove that with this statistic – it doesn't ask about faith, and it shouldn't.

And two caveats belong here: being a suspect doesn't mean being convicted. And the figures aren't adjusted for age. If you compared only young German men with young Syrian men, the gap would be smaller. How much smaller, I don't know. But I believe it would still be there.

Nevertheless: when people without the passport of an EU state commit violence, the state must not stand by. Expulsion and deportation are not racist words. They are legal instruments. And this is where it gets interesting. In 2025, 22,787 people were deported. 34,448 deportations failed ^[12]. Why? Mostly because the person wasn't found or the request was cancelled. Only around 300 failed because of resistance from the people concerned ^[12].

Make of that what you will. I claim: it's partly organised. And there is evidence for this. According to the police union GdP, around one in four planned deportations in Berlin fails because those affected have been warned in advance. Activist groups analyse flight data, identify charter flights and spread the dates a week in advance via social media and messengers, under names like "Deportation Alarm" ^[61]. When the police then arrive, nobody is there any more. Then there is church asylum (Kirchenasyl): in 2025 there were 1,792 cases ^[62]. Ironically, these are Christian congregations, not mosques. Whether mosque communities or imams also hide people from deportation is something I suspected – I found no evidence for it. So I'm not writing it down as fact either.

But the support system exists, and we can't wish it away. Whoever systematically sabotages the work of an authority that a court has ordered must be held accountable for it. Under the rule of law. With clear laws, not with outrage. The Berlin CDU wants exactly that: whoever spreads deportation dates should be liable to prosecution ^[61]. You can argue about that. But you finally have to do it.

So the law isn't the problem. The problem is enforcement.

Whoever commits serious crimes here must not count on the state eventually getting tired. Whoever fights our constitutional order, threatens Jews, oppresses women or celebrates violence as a political tool must not expect Germany to keep still forever.

But – and this matters to me: German citizens are not guests. For them criminal law applies, with full force. Whoever holds a German passport cannot be expelled, and the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) only allows citizenship to be revoked within very narrow limits. There are no second-class citizens. Not even for the ones we don't like.

Most of us don't experience any of this on the street. We experience it in the feed. And the feed has its own directors.

6 · The second horse: the feed

In the days after 17 October I saw for myself how quickly anger becomes an image. AI-generated photos of a burning Eiffel Tower. Carousels with numbers that were wrong from start to finish. Claims that fell apart when checked. And an AI that, without web search, simply refused instead of searching.

I wanted to post in anger. Then I checked. The truth was different – and still unsettling enough.

The most dangerous thing about my mistake wasn't the mistake at all. It was how good it felt. A clear picture. A simple enemy. A story that makes sense instantly.

Anger needs images. Some are built precisely for that.

And something else surprises me every time, because I read news in several languages: the same event is told differently in every country. What in Paris are "the ultra-left and criminals" is, for the French left, a government that is solely to blame. What in Milan is a protest against wars and prices barely shows up in Germany. Some carousels in my feed turned school protests into a Palestine uprising, even though Gaza didn't appear in any of the sources. That's completely skewed. And it doesn't only start at the national border. Anyone in Germany who reads the same news in a paper from Bavaria and one from Berlin notices it too. A Europe that can't even tell the same story about the same evening will find it hard to defend itself together.

That Russia orchestrated the riots in France – I have no evidence for that. So I don't claim it. That authoritarian states use disinformation as a weapon, amplify division and undermine trust in institutions, on the other hand, has long been documented, for example by the EU's diplomatic service ^[53]. Russia fights its hybrid war in Ukraine with tanks and drones. In our feeds it runs on algorithms, fake images and outraged carousels.

The second horse isn't standing in front of the gate. We're holding it in our hands. It has a screen, a camera and a share button.

And while we scroll, we build walls. Only, unfortunately, in the wrong place.

7 · The firewall

In Saxony-Anhalt the AfD won 43.8% on 6 September 2026 ^[13]. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, two weeks later, it became the strongest party with 38.2%, and the CDU was thrown out of the state parliament ^[14]. That's no longer the fringe. In Saxony-Anhalt that's almost every second vote.

At the same time, in February 2026 the Administrative Court of Cologne ruled: for now, the AfD may not be classified as "confirmed right-wing extremist". The court does, however, see anti-constitutional activities within the party, and it remains a suspected case ^[15].

You have to be able to hold both. Without playing one off against the other.

My opinion: this firewall (Brandmauer) is so pointless that it hurts. You can't disenfranchise large parts of the population just because you don't like where they put their cross. When four out of ten people vote for a party, you can't wall them off. You can't tell them: you voted, but it doesn't count. That doesn't weaken extremism. It only teaches that democracy applies as long as the result suits.

Every elected representative works for the people, not for themselves. They're allowed to have an opinion. But they must not forget who put them in the seat they're sitting in. The other elected representatives have to close ranks and find common ground – even if it hurts.

And one more thing: a firewall that only faces one direction isn't a wall. It's a door. Whoever walls off the right and lets everything through on the left, even where antisemitism marches along, applies double standards. So either get rid of it. Or build a second one. To the left.

Before anyone accuses me of applying double standards myself: here are the numbers, all of them. In Germany, right-wing motivated crime, with 42,544 cases in 2025, is the largest category, almost half of all politically motivated offences ^[25]. Right-wing violence has killed more than a hundred people since 1990 according to the federal government's count, and at least 220 according to the Amadeu Antonio Foundation ^[26]. The NSU, Halle, Hanau. I don't want to play that down, and nobody should.

But you have to look closely at what is being counted. The bulk of right-wing cases are propaganda offences, above all swastikas and banned symbols. In 2025 that was 25,098 of 42,544 right-wing offences, so almost six in ten. Among left-wing offences it was 407 of 13,490 ^[30]. Violence looks different: in 2025 there were 1,598 right-wing and 1,087 left-wing violent offences. The left-wing ones rose by a good 40% compared with the previous year, from 762 ^[30]. The right is ahead, but not threefold – more like one and a half times. And until the end of 2023 there was a rule hardly anyone knows about: antisemitic offences where nothing was known about the perpetrators were automatically counted as "right-wing". It was only scrapped in January 2024 ^[32]. So anyone who wondered for years why almost all hatred of Jews in the statistics came from the right, even though different flags were flying on the streets – had a reason. At demonstrations with a Middle East connection you can see it clearly today: in 2025, 979 antisemitic offences there were attributed to "foreign ideology", 125 to religious ideology, 30 to the left – and 9 to the right ^[32].

And then there are the houses. Rigaer 94 in Berlin-Friedrichshain, partly squatted since the nineties. The Verfassungsschutz calls it the most important "free space" of Berlin's left-wing extremist scene ^[33]. In June 2021 it took around a thousand police officers so that an expert could inspect the fire safety. The officers were greeted with fire extinguishers, bottles and pyrotechnics, there were stockpiles of stones in the building, more than 20 police officers were injured that day, and more than 70 the day before ^[34]. A fire safety inspection. In Hamburg, the Rote Flora, squatted since 1989. The interior authority itself writes that it has repeatedly been a starting point or retreat for violence in the Schanzenviertel ^[35]. Since 2014 the building has belonged to the city again ^[36]. Whoever clears one needs thousands of officers: for the Köpi trailer site in Berlin in 2021 it was around 2,000 ^[37].

And the right? That exists too, to be fair. In Rome, CasaPound has occupied a state-owned building on Via Napoleone III for more than twenty years. The damage is estimated at four million euros, leaders have been convicted, and to this day it hasn't been cleared ^[38]. In Milan, on the other hand, the left-wing Leoncavallo was cleared in August 2025 after decades ^[39]. Italy shows: looking away works in both directions. And so does clearing.

My opinion: it's time for the uncomfortable question. Why does a state under the rule of law tolerate, for decades, houses where stones are stored for the next police operation? Whoever doesn't pay for a flat is out on the street after a few months. Whoever squats a house and attacks police officers gets cult status and a press release. That's not a free space. That's a lawless space. And it should be cleared – left as well as right, in Berlin as in Rome.

But: left-wing motivated offences rose by 35% in 2025, more sharply than in any other category ^[25]. Across Europe, Europol counts twelve left-wing extremist and anarchist attacks for 2025, eleven of them carried out – more than twice as many as right-wing extremist ones. And the deadliest category in Europe is jihadism: 24 attacks, five deaths, 347 arrests ^[27].

And now comes the joke of it all: a firewall to the left actually exists. On paper. In 2018 the CDU resolved to reject coalitions and "similar forms of cooperation" with the Left Party just as it does with the AfD ^[28]. Only one half of it is lived. In Thuringia the CDU and the Left Party have been working together in practice for years ^[29]. Concrete to the right. To the left, a garden fence with a gate.

And drawing a line to the left isn't only a question of coalitions. In Germany there is an association called Rote Hilfe ("Red Aid"). It supports people who stand trial for left-wing acts, with money and lawyers. According to its statutes, "solely the politically left-wing motivation of the act" is decisive. The Verfassungsschutz monitors it as left-wing extremist; nationwide it has around 14,400 members, and in Berlin it is by far the largest left-wing extremist organisation ^[51]. Elif Eralp, the Left Party's lead candidate in Berlin, was a member for years and left in 2025. And when that drew criticism during the campaign, Sören Pellmann, one of the two leaders of the Left Party's group in the Bundestag, demonstratively joined at the beginning of October 2026 ^[51]. As recently as 2019, the Verfassungsschutz also listed four currents within the party itself as extremist, including the Communist Platform ^[52].

That's no proof that a party is planning attacks. I'm not claiming that. But it shows a support system: whoever commits violence on the street knows that someone behind them will pay for the lawyer. And leading politicians demonstratively stand alongside. Let's imagine the same case on the right: an association monitored by the Verfassungsschutz that supports right-wing violent offenders in court, and the parliamentary group leader of a Bundestag party joins it. The outrage would rightly be enormous. On the left it's enough for a few headlines and a shrug. That's a double standard.

The right is dangerous. The left is growing. Islamism kills most often in Europe. A wall that only sees one of these doesn't protect us.

I want to put the other side fairly: formally, nobody is being disenfranchised. The votes count, the seats are there. Coalitions are voluntary, and the majority that voted differently is the people too. And whoever negotiates with a party in which a court sees anti-constitutional activities has to be able to justify it. My answer: that's exactly why the confrontation belongs in parliament, on the issues, out in the light. Behind the wall it only grows.

Walls on the inside don't help. What Europe needs is a border on the outside. And a backbone on the inside.

8 · Waking up – my proposal: One in Ten Thousand

Europe isn't too friendly. It's too conflict-averse. Too often it hasn't drawn a line because it wanted to avoid the argument. And when it does act, it's with summits, papers and deadlines nobody keeps.

And yet a lot is already in place. Since 12 June 2026 the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum has been in force: for the first time, common rules for border controls, asylum procedures and solidarity ^[40]. Frontex has a Standing Corps that is due to grow to 10,000 officers by 2027. At the beginning of 2026 it was around 7,000 ^[41]. The Commission wants to triple it to 30,000. That hasn't been decided ^[41].

And then reality: for 2026, 21,000 people seeking protection were to be distributed in solidarity. Europe pledged not even half. Hungary and Slovakia: zero ^[40]. That's what European solidarity looks like when you get to pick and choose.

Hence my proposal. Very simple, so it's easy to remember:

That sounds small. But it isn't. With around 450 million Europeans, that's 45,000 women and men – more than the 30,000 Brussels has only been talking about for years. Germany provides 8,300, France around 6,800, Poland around 3,700, Malta 55. Everyone sees immediately what they owe. And everyone sees immediately who isn't delivering.

For this to work, three sentences go with it. No more:

1. Whoever comes is checked. At the external border, quickly, fairly, under the same law in Lisbon as in Warsaw.
2. Whoever may stay is taken in. With language, work, obligations. We saw in chapter 2 what happens when that is neglected for generations.
3. Whoever has to leave, leaves. Not at some point. We saw in chapter 5 that deportations mostly don't fail because of resistance but because of authorities who don't find anyone.

And because toughness without law is just arbitrariness: Frontex's Fundamental Rights Officer can currently report abuses but cannot stop an operation ^[42]. That has to change. Whoever enforces Europe's law at Europe's border must abide by Europe's law themselves. Toughness at the border. Law at the border. Both, or neither.

And finally, the thing that has accompanied me throughout this text: what isn't counted is easy to stay silent about. So let's count. Every country publishes three numbers once a quarter: how many border guards it has provided, how many people it has taken in and how many people obliged to leave have actually left. Public, comparable, readable for everyone. A report card for every country. Then nobody has to guess any more, nobody has to speculate. Me included.

How necessary that is, I noticed myself while researching this text. I wanted to compare left-wing, right-wing and Islamist violence across ten European countries. It can't be done. Every country counts differently, many don't count at all. What does exist is Europol's attack statistics: 45 attacks in 2025 in ten states, most of them in France (14), Italy (11) and Austria (7). And these three countries alone show how differently Europe burns: in France ten of the attacks were jihadist, four right-wing extremist. In Austria all seven jihadist, in Germany all four. In Italy, by contrast, all eleven were left-wing extremist or anarchist ^[43]. And there are the intelligence services' situation reports – from Copenhagen to Vienna with the same order: Islamists first, then right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists clearly behind ^[44]. Europe has a common single market, a common currency, even a common charging cable for your phone. But no common number for who is attacking its values.

This isn't a finished law. It's a thought model, as in "Europa im Ausverkauf" ("Europe in a Sell-Off") ^[17]. An impulse. Whoever can make it better should do so.

Almost a year ago I wrote that Europe seems tired. Today I believe: it isn't tired. It's asleep.

And sleep is dangerous because it's comfortable. You no longer hear anything. You only see what you're shown.

One in Ten Thousand. That's where waking up begins.

9 · Conclusion: What I had to rethink

On 5 November 2025 I wrote about "Europa im Ausverkauf" ^[17]. Back then it was about parcels from China, about cheap goods, about an economy that defends rules while others build markets. Today it's about more: whether we still defend our values when it becomes uncomfortable.

Where was I wrong? I thought France was burning because of Palestine. It burned because schools, prices and anger came together – and because others exploited that. My lesson: not every outrage in the feed is an explanation.

Where have I become sharper? On the question of who hijacks protests. On the distinction between Islam and Islamism – we mustn't confuse them, but we still have to name them. On the firewall that gives millions the feeling of not being heard. And on the question of whether a state that has laws and doesn't enforce them is still a state under the rule of law.

The counter-voices belong here. Most people in October were peaceful. Not everyone who criticises Israel's government is an antisemite. Not every migrant is a criminal. Not every Muslim is an Islamist. And the polemical term "islamo-gauchisme" must not be used to defame every left-wing position – even France's research centre CNRS doesn't consider it a scientific term ^[18].

Compassion for the civilians in Gaza and toughness against extremists are not mutually exclusive. They belong together. Whoever lets human rights apply to everyone and not just to their own people has understood what Europe is meant to be.

One image from these days won't leave my head. I had it made for my carousel ^[63]; it's an AI illustration, not a photo. But it could have been taken in any of these cities: on the morning after, a shopkeeper stands in front of his door. Eleven stars charred. One still glowing.

The horse is in the city. We can pretend it's a gift. Or we wake up.

Where do you draw the line?

Sources

1. France: ZDFheute, 19.10.2026 (2,331 people taken into custody, 997 security personnel injured) · https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/ausland/frankreich-proteste-gewalt-randalierer-macron-nunez-100.html · Europe 1, 19.10.2026 (2,397 arrests) · https://www.europe1.fr/police-justice/emeutes-du-17-octobre-quel-est-le-profil-des-casseurs-interpelles-par-les-forces-de-lordre-1161093 · Die Zeit (550,000 / 110,000; Lecornu "ultra-left") · https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2026-10/proteste-frankreich-ausschreitungen-paris-sebastien-lecornu-ultralinke-gruppe-gxe · Quotes Macron "overthrow the Republic" and Mélenchon: Al Jazeera / Reuters 18.10.2026
2. Euronews, 17.10.2026 · https://de.euronews.com/2026/10/17/frankreich-rustet-sich-fur-protesttag-sicherheitslage-im-fokus
3. Northern Italy: Al Jazeera, Oct. 2026 ·
4. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Verfassungsschutz Report 2025, pp. 62–65 · https://verfassungsschutzberichte.de/pdfs/vsbericht-2025.pdf
5. Berlin House of Representatives, printed paper 19/24667 · https://pardok.parlament-berlin.de/starweb/adis/citat/VT/19/SchrAnfr/S19-24667.pdf
6. Europol, TE-SAT 2026, p. 14 · https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-TE-SAT-2026.pdf
7. Berliner Zeitung, 23.10.2024 · https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/article/berliner-linke-klaus-lederer-und-weitere-ex-senatoren-verlassen-partei-2265470
8. BfV, Facts and figures on Islamism · https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten/zahlen-und-fakten_node.html
9. Berlin Senate, Verfassungsschutz Report 2025 · https://www.berlin.de/sen/inneres/verfassungsschutz/aktuelle-meldungen/2026/artikel.1676481.php
10. BKA, Police Crime Statistics (PKS) 2025, 20.04.2026 · https://www.bka.de/DE/Presse/Listenseite_Pressemitteilungen/2026/Presse2026/260420_PM_PKS_SKiD.html
11. Destatis, Central Register of Foreign Nationals 31.12.2025 · https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/_inhalt.html
12. German Bundestag, printed paper 21/4403 · https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/044/2104403.pdf
13. bpb, Saxony-Anhalt state election 2026 · https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/581006/landtagswahl-in-sachsen-anhalt-2026-afd-staerkste-kraft/
14. bpb, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state election 2026 · https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/581565/landtagswahl-in-mecklenburg-vorpommern-2026/
15. ZDFheute, 26.02.2026 · https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/afd-gericht-einstufung-rechtsextrem-100.html
17. Alexandre Zellermayer, "Europa im Ausverkauf", 5.11.2025 · https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/europa-im-ausverkauf-und-warum-wir-endlich-wieder-uns-zellermayer-h89ie
18. CNRS, statement 17.02.2021 · https://rehve.fr/wp-content/uploads/CNRS_20210217_Islamogauchisme.pdf
19. L'Essor, 13.09.2023 (IGA/IGJ report, 385 convicted, via AFP) · https://lessor.org/societe/le-profil-des-emeutiers-interpelles-apres-la-mort-du-jeune-nahel-fin-juin/
20. Europe 1, 19.10.2026 · https://www.europe1.fr/police-justice/emeutes-du-17-octobre-quel-est-le-profil-des-casseurs-interpelles-par-les-forces-de-lordre-1161093
21. France, ethnic statistics: Conseil constitutionnel no. 2007-557 DC; CNIL recommendation June 2025 (analysis by CMS) · https://cms.law/en/fra/news-information/la-mesure-de-la-diversite-ethnique-en-entreprise-est-elle-vraiment-interdite
22. Human Dignity Trust, country profile Palestine (Gaza: Criminal Code Ordinance 1936, § 152(2)) · https://humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/palestine
23. Human Dignity Trust, country profile Iran (Penal Code 2013) · https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/iran/
24. Amnesty International, 04.12.2018 ("Blood-soaked secrets", mass executions 1988) · https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2018/12/iran-committing-crimes-against-humanity-by-concealing-fate-of-thousands-of-slaughtered-political-dissidents/
25. bpb, BKA report on politically motivated crime (PMK) 2025 · https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/taegliche-dosis-politik/578846/bericht-des-bka-zur-politisch-motivierten-kriminalitaet/
26. bpb, NSU complex / victims of right-wing violence · https://www.bpb.de/themen/rechtsextremismus/nsu-komplex/573902/der-nationalsozialistische-untergrund-eine-dis-kontinuitaet-rechtsextremistischer-gewalt/
27. Europol, TE-SAT 2026, pp. 19 and 21 · https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-TE-SAT-2026.pdf
28. CDU, resolution of 08.12.2018 · https://archiv.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/cdu_deutschlands_unsere_haltung_zu_linkspartei_und_afd_0.pdf?file=1
29. Tagesschau, Aug. 2026 (Ramelow, CDU/Left Party) · https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/ramelow-linke-cdu-sachsen-anhalt-100.html
30. BKA, nationwide case numbers PMK 2025 and 2024 (factsheets, tables 1, 2, 9) · https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/2025PMKFallzahlen.pdf · Mirror: https://www.lsvd.de/media/doc/2445/2025pmkfallzahlen.pdf
32. German Bundestag, printed paper 21/5653, 27.04.2026 · https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/056/2105653.pdf
33. BfV, "High potential for violence in the struggle for left-wing extremist free spaces", 24.06.2025 · https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/hintergruende/DE/linksextremismus/hohes-gewaltpotenzial-im-kampf-um-linksextremistische-freiraeume.html
34. Berliner Kurier, 17.06.2021 · https://www.berliner-kurier.de/article/rigaer-94-polizei-bricht-tueren-zu-auf-165824
35. Hamburg Authority for the Interior and Sport, "Rote Flora" · https://www.hamburg.de/politik-und-verwaltung/behoerden/behoerde-fuer-inneres-und-sport/rote-flora-944332
36. Hamburg Finance Authority, handover 1.11.2014 · https://www.hamburg.de/politik-und-verwaltung/behoerden/finanzbehoerde/aktuelles/201-10-31-rote-flora-507618
37. Tagesspiegel, 30.10.2022 · https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/kopi-liebig-34-syndikat-das-wurde-aus-berlins-geraumten-linken-projekten-8810920.html
38. Open, 11.09.2026 · https://www.open.online/2026/09/11/casapound-via-napoleone-roma-sgombero-affitto/
39. Il Post, 21.08.2025 · https://www.ilpost.it/2025/08/21/leoncavallo-milano-centro-sociale-sgomberato/
40. Euronews, 10.06.2026 – EU asylum pact comes into force · https://de.euronews.com/2026/06/10/eu-asylpakt-migration
41. Frontex, Standing Corps · https://www.frontex.europa.eu/careers/standing-corps/about/ · and Digit/site36, 10.06.2026 · https://digit.site36.net/2026/06/10/frontex-takes-command-eu-border-agency-gains-more-capabilities-before-new-regulation-is-passed/
42. Digit/site36, 10.06.2026 (Fundamental Rights Officer without enforcement powers) · see ^[41]
43. Europol, TE-SAT 2026, p. 20 (attacks by state and affiliation) · https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-TE-SAT-2026.pdf
44. Denmark, Centre for Terror Analysis 2025 · https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/eu-knowledge-hub-prevention-radicalisation/welcome-package/learning-resources/assessment-terrorist-threat-denmark-2025_en · Austria, DSN report 2025 · https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/eu-knowledge-hub-prevention-radicalisation/welcome-package/learning-resources/2025-report-protection-constitution-austria_en
45. bpb, "November pogrom 1938" · https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/542301/novemberpogrom-1938/
46. RIAS, annual report 2025 (17.06.2026) · https://report-antisemitism.de/documents/17-06-26_RIAS_Bund_Jahresbericht_2025.pdf
47. Sud Radio, Oct. 2026 (after AFP) · https://www.sudradio.fr/sud-radio/violences-du-17-octobre-les-marques-de-luxe-francais-en-premiere-ligne
48. Handelsblatt (dpa), 20.09.2026 · https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/abgeordnetenhauswahl-clan-mitglied-auf-linken-party-partei-distanziert-sich/100255975.html
49. Tagesspiegel, 29.09.2026 · https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/wahlabend-in-neukolln-gibt-es-noch-einen-clan-fall-in-der-berliner-linken-16103492.html
50. Europol, TE-SAT 2007–2026 (analysis by Claude, table in 05-research/2026-10-19__CLAUDE-RECHERCHE-europol-tesat-2006-2025.md) · https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report
51. Volksstimme (dpa), 01.10.2026 · https://www.volksstimme.de/panorama/linksfraktionschef-pellmann-jetzt-mitglied-der-roten-hilfe-4330288 · ms-aktuell, 29.09.2026 · https://ms-aktuell.de/welt/eralp-rote-hilfe-29-09-2026/
52. Senate of Bremen, 23.02.2021 (based on BfV report 2019) · https://www.rathaus.bremen.de/sixcms/media.php/13/top%2013_20210223_Extremistische_Strukturen_der_Partei_DIE_LINKE.pdf
53. EEAS, 3rd report on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), 19.03.2025 · https://eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en
54. Toute l'Europe, July 2026 (Le Pen appeal ruling, 07.07.2026) · https://www.touteleurope.eu/vie-politique-des-etats-membres/proces-des-assistants-du-rn-marine-le-pen-condamnee-en-appel-mais-eligible-a-l-election-presidentielle-2027/
55. Public Sénat, 25.11.2025 (Odoxa, second round Bardella) · https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/politique/sondage-jordan-bardella-remporterait-la-presidentielle-2027-quel-que-soit-son-adversaire
56. Public Sénat, 19.10.2026 ("Après les pillages du 17 octobre, faut-il couper les réseaux sociaux ?") · https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/politique/apres-les-pillages-du-17-octobre-faut-il-couper-les-reseaux-sociaux
57. franceinfo, Oct. 2026 (resale on Vinted/Leboncoin) · https://www.franceinfo.fr/societe/mobilisation-du-17-octobre/des-objets-voles-lors-des-pillages-du-17-octobre-revendus-en-ligne-la-plateforme-vinted-assure-appliquer-une-tolerance-zero_8243857.html
58. Attacks in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray (26.07.2016) and Nice Notre-Dame (29.10.2020)
59. Associated Press, 15.08.2016 (analysis of approx. 4,030 IS registration forms, via Global News) · https://globalnews.ca/news/2882884/islamic-state-preys-on-the-religiously-ignorant-according-to-leaked-documents
60. German Bundestag, hib / printed paper 21/5881, 08.05.2026 (suspect rates for violent crime 2025) · https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-1178800 · https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/058/2105881.pdf
61. Tagesspiegel, 05.07.2025 (GdP: one in four deportations fails due to advance warning; CDU initiative) · https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/missbrauch-von-vertraulichen-informationen-berliner-cdu-will-fluchtlingsaktivisten-bestrafen-die-abschiebungen-verraten-13973525.html
62. evangelisch.de (epd), 12.09.2026 (federal government church asylum figures) · https://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/259056/12-09-2026/bundesamt-erkennt-kirchenasyle-selten-als-hartefalle
63. Nur Ein Typ on Instagram, carousel "Europa · Okt. 26" · https://www.instagram.com/p/DerHGkeEf1u/?img_index=1